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Using panel data from more than 100 countries around the world from 1988 through 2007, this paper 
examines the relationship between economic and social globalization and absolute income poverty ex 
post. We use the globalization index developed by Dreher (2006) and the World Bank poverty estimates. 
Using a fixed-effect panel based on five-year averages and using a ―long run‖ first difference regression, 
we find a robust negative correlation between globalization and poverty. We further examine mechanisms 
and robustness by separately analyzing the effects of components of economic (trade flows and trade 
policies) and social globalization (information flows, personal contact and cultural proximity) respectively, 
controlling for growth, education, inflation, urbanization, and government consumption. Results suggest 
that information flows and more liberal trade restrictions are robustly negatively correlated with absolute 
poverty. While growth decreases poverty in the long run, only a small part of the poverty-reducing effect 
of globalization is mediated via growth. 
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The effect of globalization on the world’s poor is a highly debated topic. Typically defined as the process 
by which different countries become more closely integrated, globalization has been portrayed both as a 
cause of poverty and as a solution to the same problem. Due to data limitations, research has thus far 
been  unable  to  provide  conclusive  evidence  on  the  relationship  between  globalization  and  absolute 
poverty, as measured by the population share living below one PPP dollar per day. Existing research either 
concludes that economic openness is likely to reduce poverty because it has been shown to increase 
growth (Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002), Dollar and Kraay (2004)), or examines ex ante poverty using 
CGE-models (Ganuza et al., 2005). There are also some cross-country studies focusing on actual poverty 
outcomes such as Heshmati (2007), but the few existing panel data studies cover a very limited set of 
countries such as Agénor (2004) with N=16.1  
This paper examines how globalization is linked to changes in ex post absolute poverty in a way 
that is detailed enough to provide a basis for the ongoing policy discussion relating, for example, to the 
UN Millennium Development Goals with regard to poverty reduction. We find that globalization is on 
average followed by lower poverty; however, only a small part of the effect is media ted via the growth 
channel. 
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, recent improvements in data 
availability allow us to construct a panel dataset with better coverage than previous studies. Our 
regressions include more than 100 countries, with poverty data averaged over four five-year periods, the 
first one being 1988 to 1992. 
Second, using the so -called KOF Index of Globalization, developed by Dreher (2006) and 
updated in Dreher et al. (2008), allows for an identification of the poverty effects of economic and social 
globalization separately. Moreover, for economic globalization, the index allows us to distinguish between 
trade flows and trade policies such as tariff rates. For social globalization, we separately analyze the 
poverty effects of information flows, personal contacts, and a measure of cultural proximity based on 
trade in books and the number of McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA stores per capita. 
Third,  in  addition  to  analyzing  a  panel  with  five-year  averages,  we  also  regress  changes  in 
globalization on subsequent changes in absolute poverty over a longer time period (12 years is the average 
duration in our sample), controlling for economic growth. This approach allows for an examination of 
how much of the effect of globalization on poverty is mediated by growth. 
Fourth,  by  using  interaction  terms,  we  analyze  if  there  are  circumstances  under  which  the 
relationship between globalization and poverty is particularly strong. For example, we examine if the 
association  varies  with  level  of  democracy,  country  size  of  the  informal  sector  and  the  quality  of 
institutions. We also examine possible complementarities between economic and social globalization. 
                                                           
1   There are, however, some illuminating case studies of specific countries, including Verme (2010) for Kazakhstan, and Ravallion 
(2006) for China and Morocco. 3 
 
The results suggest a robust negative relationship between globalization and absolute poverty, 
which  is  consistent  with  the  J-curve  hypothesis,  discussed  by,  for  example,  Agénor  (2004),  where 
increased  globalization  associates  with  short-run  transition  costs  that  may  increase  poverty,  while 
globalization decreases poverty in the long run. In particular, information flows and more liberal trade 
restrictions robustly relate to lower poverty. When controlling for economic growth, the magnitude of the 
effect of globalization on poverty decreases only marginally, suggesting that higher growth is not the main 
mechanism through which globalization reduces poverty, a finding in line with some recent evidence (see 
for example Verme (2010), studying the development in Kazakhstan), but it is in stark contrast to standard 
references such as Dollar and Kraay (2004) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002).  
The article proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the literature on the relationship between 
types  of  globalization  and  growth,  and  discusses  potential  problems  related  to  the  measurement  of 
poverty. Section II provides an analytical framework discussing the possible links from globalization to 
absolute  poverty.  Section  III  describes  our  data  and  empirical  strategy,  and  presents  baseline  panel 
regression  results.  Section  IV  analyzes  the  role  of  potential  mechanisms  mediating  the  globalization-
poverty relationship, while section V examines the long-run association. The article closes with some 
concluding remarks on the implications of the findings. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Views on the relationship between globalization and poverty 
Most studies of how globalization affects poverty focus on economic globalization, in particular trade 
openness. The standard approach, illustrated in figure 1a, is to examine the effect on poverty by focusing 
on economic growth as a mediator, something Harrison and McMillan (2007) call “the orthodox view” (p. 
124). A typical example is Dollar and Kraay (2004), who argue that trade is good for growth, and that 
there  is  no  systematic  relationship  between  changes  in  trade  volumes  and  changes  in  the  income 
distribution. Thus, they conclude, if trade or some other measure of economic openness increases growth 
rates, this translates into proportionate increases in the income of the poor.2  
In the short run, however, globalization can affect absolute poverty regardless of its effect on 
growth.  Growth  occurs  when  average  real  income  increases,  but  absolute  poverty  depends  on  how 
globalization affects the incomes of the poor. Theoretically, poverty may consequently decrease without 
growth  or  increase  despite  growth.  The  ambiguity  of  the  relationship  between  growth  and  poverty 
reduction is not only a theoretical oddity: using data on 58 developing countries for the period 1980-1998, 
Kalwij and Verschoor (2007) find large regional variations in the capacity of growth to reduce absolute 
poverty. (The effect was found to be smallest in sub-Saharan Africa, and largest in the Middle East and 
North Africa region). 
                                                           
2 Another brief survey using the standard approach is Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002). For more in-depth surveys of research 
regarding on economic globalization and poverty, see Agénor (2004) and Aisbett, et al. (2005). 4 
 
Figure  1b  presents  an  alternative,  and  to  us  preferred,  view  of  the  chain  of  mechanisms: 
globalization  affects  prices,  incomes  and  information  flows.  Depending  on  how  incomes,  prices  and 
behavior change, growth and/or poverty reduction may be the outcome. 
 
FIGURE 1. Two views on the relations between globalization, growth and poverty 
 
a      b 
    
 
Our disapproval of the orthodox view is not new: Lundberg and Lyn (2003) argue that “the evolution of 
growth and inequality must surely be the outcome of similar processes” (p. 326). And Bourguignon (2004) notes that 
changes in poverty depend on growth in two ways: the initial income distribution and the change in the 
income distribution caused by growth. 
Conclusions  on  the  effect  of  globalization  on  poverty  relying  only  on  the  chain  from 
globalization  to  growth  to  poverty  reduction  are  problematic  also  in  light  of  the  literature  linking 
globalization to inequality: If globalization causes both growth and higher income dispersion, the effect on 
poverty is ambiguous. In fact, Bergh and Nilsson (2010), Milanovic and Squire (2006), and Lundberg and 
Lyn (2003) ﬁnd evidence that trade or economic globalization tends to increase inequality. Bergh and 
Nilsson, however, note that the inequality effect is driven by the relationship in rich and middle-income 
countries, while Milanovic and Squire report that higher trade volume increases income inequality in poor 
countries only. 
While these seemingly conflicting results may all be explained by differences in samples and the 
measurements used, the varying results nicely illustrate an essential point. To infer how globalization 










between globalization and growth automatically implies less poverty. Instead, we will examine levels and 
first differences on how globalization relates to subsequent poverty. 
In defense of the standard approach, it is worth mentioning that in the long run it is highly 
unlikely that growth occurs without a reduction of absolute poverty. From a policy perspective, however, 
it is still interesting to gain knowledge on whether the long run translates to 5 or 15 years, or even longer. 
 
Measuring poverty and globalization 
Measuring poverty involves a number of potential problems. For recent overviews of the debate and 
methodological choices involved, see Anand et al. (2010) and Deaton (2010). 
First, the World Bank’s poverty line set at one dollar (PPP adjusted) per day can be criticized for 
being  too  narrow.  As  the argument  goes,  poverty  is a  multidimensional  concept  that  should not  be 
reduced to a monetary measure of purchasing power. 
Second,  there  is  also  a  debate  amongst  those  who  accept  the  dollar-a-day  measurement. 
Fundamentally, there is no obvious best way to calculate measures of absolute purchasing power that are 
comparable  across  both  time  and  space  when  relative  prices  vary  over  time  and  between  countries. 
Deaton (2010) describes how the level of headcount poverty and global Gini coefficients vary between 
versions of the World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Penn World Tables, but also notes that the 
trend over time is not sensitive to this data choice: the total percentage in absolute poverty and the 
population weighted Gini coefficient for GDP per capita decreased during the 1980s and the 1990s (a 
change largely driven by the development in China and India). 
Third, the World Bank estimates rely heavily on household surveys, resulting in questionable 
comparability  and  low  coverage  for  certain  geographical  regions,  for  example  sub-Saharan  Africa. 
Alternative  estimates  on  mean  income  can  be  drawn  from  national  accounts,  but  these  tend  to 
overestimate mean income, as tax revenues and corporate profits are included in GDP per capita. 
Replying to critics, Ravallion (2010) argues that the practice of updating estimations and revising 
the poverty line when confronted with new data has led to fluctuations, but this should not lead one to 
question  the  methodology  used:  the  World  Bank  estimates  remain  the  best  projections  available  for 
studying absolute poverty worldwide. Our preferred measure of absolute poverty is the headcount index 
calculated for a poverty line of one PPP dollar per day from the World Bank (2010). 
The question of how to best measure economic globalization or economic openness has also 
been subjected to intense discussions. One of the most used measures of economic openness is the index 
introduced by Sachs and Warner (1995). This index, however, is binary and questions have been raised by, 
among others, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) with regard to what it actually measures.3  An important point 
brought up by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) is the distinction between trade flows (such as imports and 
exports) and trade policies (such as tariffs, taxes and regulations). Studies finding that trade flows are 
                                                           
3 Responding to some of the critiques, Wacziarg and Welch (2008) update the Sachs-Warner index and find it to be significantly 
related to growth during the 1970s and the 1980s, but not during the 1990s. The same result appears in Rajan and Subramanian 
(2008). 6 
 
linked to growth are not sufficient to conclude that policies of economic openness lead to growth. More 
liberal trade restrictions need not necessarily lead to higher trade flows. 
Globalization is, however, not only a question of economic openness. As discussed by Arribas 
et al. (2009), internationalization presents many facets because of the various types of interactions it 
involves, many of which may potentially affect poverty. Our preferred measure of globalization is the so-
called KOF Index developed by Dreher (2006) and updated in Dreher et al. (2008). The index quantifies 
economic, social and political globalization, using principal components analysis, to construct an aggregate 
index  that  is  comparable  over  time  and  between  countries.  In  addition  to  allowing  for  a  separation 
between three dimensions of globalization, economic globalization can be further broken down into trade 
flows and trade policies, and social globalization into information flows, personal contact and cultural proximity. The 
index is updated every year and available on the web. Details can be found in table 1 and table A1 in the 
Appendix. For further information, see Dreher et al. (2008).  
This  examination  particularly  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  economic  and  social 
globalization and poverty, but leaves out a separate analysis of the political dimension of globalization. 
The indicators of political globalization are slightly hard to interpret, as there are no clear theoretical 
predictions as to how the indicators may affect poverty, and the problems of reverse causality may be 
severe. However, when using the aggregate index, political globalization is included. We do this in order to 
obtain results for globalization when measured the way intended by the creators of the KOF Index. 
 
II.  POSSIBLE LINKS FROM GLOBALIZATION TO POVERTY 
Mainstream economic theory suggests several mechanisms through which economic openness may foster 
growth.  Specialization,  scale  economies,  competition,  incentives  for  macro-economic  stability,  and 
innovation are all mechanisms likely to be important. More integration in the global economy may also 
increase the returns to higher education in poor countries, as described by Stark (2004), with positive long-
run growth effects through human capital. Many of these effects are likely to require some time to also 
affect poverty, and as discussed before the poverty effect may be counteracted by increases in the income 
dispersion. Agénor (2004) describes several reasons for expecting economic globalization to decrease poverty 
in the long run but notes that due to various types of short-run costs, the short-term effect may, however, 
be an increase in absolute poverty. Such reasons include: 
•  Transition costs: As an economy opens, more and cheaper capital becomes available. When firms 
replace labor with capital in production, poverty may increase before laid-off workers find new 
employment. Increased competition following economic openness may also affect unemployment 
by forcing some domestic firms out of business. 
•  Shortage of human capital: If openness leads to the introduction of more advanced technologies, 
or more capital intense production, the full benefits may require more skilled labor than is initially 
available. 7 
 
•  Better possibilities to work abroad are likely to increase the education premium, and as Stark 
(2004) describes, this likely affects the domestic stock of human capital but the mechanism is 
likely to work slowly. 
•  As discussed by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002), higher economic openness likely comes with a 
greater commitment to low inflation, which should foster growth in the long run and particularly 
assist the poor if they are vulnerable to inflation. The transition from high to low inflation may, 
however, be associated with higher unemployment in the short run. 
•  Globalization might affect government size and, for example, social spending, in turn affecting 
poverty. Two  opposite  mechanisms  have  been suggested:  the  race  to  the  bottom  hypothesis 
(Sinn,  1997),  where  open  economies  compete  by  lowering  taxes  for  example,  and  the 
compensation  hypothesis  suggested  by  Rodrik  (1998)  and  Lindbeck  (1975),  where  open 
economies develop larger welfare states as an insurance institution. 
In the presence of transition costs and the various time lags of the expected beneficial effects, there are 
strong  reasons  to  expect  an  increase  in  globalization  to  have  an  inverted  J-curve  effect  on  absolute 
poverty. 
Not all mechanisms suggest that economic globalization leads to lower poverty, even in the long 
run.  For  example,  Kawachi  and  Wamala  (2007)  suggest  that  openness  can  lead  to  a  faster  and 
geographically broader spread of infectious diseases (such as HIV and the H5N1 avian influenza virus), 
which may increase poverty through lower productivity and labor supply. This adverse effect may well hit 
the poor relatively more, and thus serves as an example why openness may promote growth without 
decreasing poverty.  
The KOF Index divides social globalization into information flows, personal contacts and cultural 
proximity, which are all likely to affect the functioning of markets, as well as the behavior of buyers and 
sellers on the market. In general, the functioning of markets is critically dependent on information ﬂows. In 
less developed countries with high transaction costs and potentially large information asymmetries, there 
is a large potential gain in market efficiency from increased use of information and communications 
technologies (ICT). Both telecommunications and the Internet are powerful tools for information transfer 
and improve the functioning of markets in general.4  As noted by Aker and Mbiti (2010), the distribution 
of these efficiency gains among consumers, producers and firms is theoretically ambiguous. Lower search 
costs could benefit sellers in the short term if they make better use of spatial arbit rage opportunities, but 
as markets become more competitive, benefits will shift towards consumers as markets approach the law 
of one price (Aker and Mbiti, p. 216). There are also studies showing that rural telephony increases the 
prices farmers receive for their crops and the earnings from off -farm activities (e.g., Duncombe (1999) 
and Elbers and Lanjouw (2001)). Empirical evidence also suggests that telephone services can improve 
                                                           
4 A classic example of telecommunication is Hirschman (1967), showing how long distance telephone networks led to a credit 
market for coffee trade in Ethiopia. A more recent example is when the Indian company ITC launched a system called e-
Choupals, which enabled rural farmers to connect themselves and check crop prices online. This led to many of them bypassing 
local auction markets and selling crops directly to ITC for $6 more per tonne than they previously received (Pralahad and 
Hammond, 2002). 8 
 
government services such as health care (ITU, 1998). Forestier et al. (2002) summarize a wide array of 
research on the effects of ICT on growth and inequality, and show that ICT in general is positively related 
to  growth,  but  the  effect  on  inequality  is  less  clear.  For  any  new  information  and  communication 
technology,  inequality  is  likely  to  increase  in  the  short  run,  when  only  a  small  elite  may  access  the 
technology.  As  more  people  get  access,  inequality  falls.  This  reasoning  applies  to  telephony,  mobile 
phones and Internet access. 
In  general,  information  decreases  transaction  costs  resulting  in  markets  approaching  the 
competitive equilibrium. Because transaction costs essentially work as a tax wedge, the effect of lowering 
such  costs  can  be  illustrated  as  shown  in  figure  2.  When  transaction  costs  are  present,  transactions 
between buyers and sellers will only take place if the difference between producers’ reservation price and 
consumers’ willingness to pay exceeds the transaction cost. In the figure, lowering transaction costs from 
t0  to  t1  decreases  the  minimum  difference  between  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  and  producers’ 
reservation price necessary for transactions to take place. Just like taxes, the burden of high transaction 
costs is shared between producers and consumers, and lowering transaction costs will increase output. 
 
FIGURE 2: The welfare effect of lower transaction costs 
 
In addition to information flows, social globalization comprises cross-border personal contacts. Outgoing 
telephone  traffic  likely  affects  economic  outcomes  through  the  transmission  of  information  and 
knowledge, similar to many indicators of information flows. Other types of personal contacts such as 
tourism have less obvious consequences. Chao et al. (2004) note that tourism is good for development 
through terms of trade effect and resource flows; however, possible negative externalities of mass tourism 
might offset these effects. As noted by Kondoh (1999), there is an important difference between tourism 
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and immigration (also included in the social globalization index though the percent of foreign population): 
both affect the demand side, but the latter also affects the supply side of the host economy.5  
The third and final component of social globa lization in the KOF Index is  cultural proximity, 
measured by the number of McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA stores per capita, as well as trade in books 
in percent of GDP. In developing countries, most of the index’s variation is related to the opening of 
McDonald’s restaurants. Indeed, McDonald’s is often used as a symbol of globalization and has also given 
rise to the sociological term McDonaldization.6  The use of McDonald’s restaurants in the index highlights 
the importance of mechanisms described by Medez and Popkin (2004): globalization may enhance access 
to  non-traditional  food,  influencing  dietary  patterns  throughout  the  developing  world  with  possible 
implications for overweight/obesity. 
Obviously,  the  opening  of  multinational  companies  like  McDonald’s  and  IKEA  requires  a 
certain  level  of  economic  globalization.  IKEA,  for  example,  relies  heavily  on  cheap  imports  from 
developing countries in Asia. Therefore, it is only to be expected that the levels of economic and social 
globalization are positively correlated (r = 0.83), and in our main specifications they are not included 
simultaneously. It is of interest, however, to examine if the factors captured by social globalization add 
something that is not only a proxy for economic globalization.7  There may also be complementarities in 
globalization such that the effect of social globalization on poverty is bigger when economic globalization 
is high, or vice versa. 
Following the above discussion, t able 1 summarizes our measures of globalization and their 
expected effects on poverty. Few of the possible links between dimensions of globalization and absolute 
poverty are theoretically unambiguous, a situation that calls for empirical examination.  
   
                                                           
5 Links between tourism, trade and growth have also been recently investigated by Katircioglu (2009) for the case of Cyprus. 
6 The term does, however, however not refer to the spread of McDonald’s restaurants, but rather to ―the process by which the 
principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society, as well as the rest of 
the world.‖ (Ritzer, 1996:293) 
7 Views differ as to whether to include the various dimensions of globalization simultaneously or not. Heckelman and Stroup 
(2005) argue that any summary index may result in a misspecification bias, and suggest also performing the analysis using the 
actual individual components. Dreher and Gaston (2008), however, argue that components of globalization should be regressed in 
the same specification, as the different components are highly correlated, to control for other globalization dimensions. 10 
 
 
TABLE 1. Indicators of economic and social globalization: expected effects on poverty 
Type of 
globalization 
Economic  Social 
Measure  Flows:  Trade,  investments  and 
international  transfers  (%  of 
GDP). 
 
Policies:  Mean  tariff  rates,  taxes, 
import  barriers,  and  capital 
account restrictions. 
Information  flows:  Internet  hosts,  Internet  users, 
cable  television  and  radios  (all  measured  per 
capita), trade in newspapers (% of GDP). 
 
Personal  contacts:  Outgoing  telephone  traffic, 
transfers,  tourism,  and  foreign  population  in 
percent  of  total  population. 
 
Cultural  proximity:  McDonald’s  and  IKEA  per 




Prices and wages via changes in 
supply and demand. 
Available information. Supply and demand. 
Possible  long-
run effects on 
Growth  and  innovation,  human 
capital (Stark, 2004). 
Social  norms  and  lifestyle  (Medez  and  Popkin 





Ambiguous  in  the  short  run, 
negative in the long run. 
Ambiguous both in the short and long run. 
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III.  DATA, EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND BASELINE RESULTS 
Our dataset covers the 1988-2007 period, with data averaged over four five-year periods: 1988-1992, 
1993-1997, 1998-2002, and 2003-2007. The panel is unbalanced but includes information for more than 
100  countries,  and  the  efficient  sample  consists  of  close  to  300  observations  meeting  baseline 
specifications. An absolute majority of these observations refers to conditions in countries classified as 
low- or lower-middle-income countries with a 2008 GNI per capita of USD 3,855 or less. Table A2 in the 
Appendix presents descriptive statistics and sources for all variables used in the analysis, and table A3 in 
the Appendix presents details about the country sample. 
The main dependent variable is the headcount index, defined as the percentage of the population 
in a particular country living on less than one dollar per day (PPP adjusted 1993). This measure comes 
from the Povcal database (World Bank, 2010) and is derived from household surveys.8  In the sensitivity 
analysis, we also use the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap, which account for the distribution of 
the poor as alternative dependent variables (taken from the same source).9  
Our globalization measure is the KOF Index (Dreher et al., 2008), as described in section I. We 
use the index both as a composite measure (KOF), in which the three dimensions of globalization are 
equally weighted together, and in a disaggregated format (KOF1 and KOF2). Moreover, we use the sub-
components for the economic and the social globalization index (flows and restrictions, and information flows, 
personal contact and cultural proximity, respectively). The index takes values between 0 and 100 with higher 
values indicating more globalization.  
Because we expect an increase in globalization to have an inverted J-curve effect on poverty, we 
would ideally want to estimate a dynamic model that allows us to explore in detail the shape of such a J-
curve. Lack of data prevents us from using such models, but other methodological possibilities remain. 
One is to estimate the relationship in first differences during a period sufficiently long so that the effects 
of globalization are likely to be dominated by the long-run (poverty-decreasing) effects. We do this in 
section IV. Another possibility is to estimate a panel with globalization and poverty observed at regular 
intervals,  allowing  for  non-linear  effects  to  account  for  the  inverted  J-curve  relation.  A  graphical 
explanation is given in figure 3, which illustrates the expected effect of a positive shock to globalization 
occurring at time t. If the inverted J-curve hypothesis is correct, and the interval is sufficiently long, we 
observe decreased poverty at t+1. 
Curve  A  illustrates  a  small  positive  globalization  shock  at  time  t.  If  a  larger  shock  to 
globalization leads to larger transition costs, but also to greater long-run benefits, the inverted J-curve will 
look like curve B, in which case poverty at t+1 will be higher, despite eventually becoming lower.   
                                                           
8  There  is  a  large  discrepancy  between  national  accounts  and  survey  data  estimates  of  consumption.  A  major  source  of 
controversy among researchers in the field relates to the question of what source of information should be used to accurately 
measure the level and change of poverty. For a thorough review of the advantages and limitations of survey-based measures, see 
Deaton (2001). 
9 In all but four cases—India, China, Indonesia, and Argentina—information on poverty outcomes refers to a national level. For 
these countries, we instead make use of poverty estimates referring to rural and urban areas. Our result and conclusions do not 
change when excluding these particular observations from the analysis. 12 
 
FIGURE 3. The effect on poverty of a positive shock to globalization at time t in the presence of short-
run transition costs and long-run poverty-decreasing effects   
Curve A: small increase in globalization at time t. Curve B: large increase in globalization at t. 
As shown in figure 3, if the observations are sufficiently far apart in time, we expect bigger increases in 
globalization to lead to larger decreases in poverty, and a linear model will do. However, if poverty 
observations occur at t and t+1 as shown in the figure, we will actually observe higher poverty at t+1 for 
the  larger  globalization  shock  (curve  B)  compared  to  the  smaller  shock  (curve  A).  In  this  case,  the 
empirical patterns consistent with the inverted J-curve theory will be a negative coefficient on the linear 
term and a positive coefficient on the squared term in a regression of poverty on globalization with time 
and  country-fixed  effects  and  poverty  observed  five  years  after  globalization.  In  a  first  difference 
regression using the longest durations available in the data, we expect a negative relation between changes 
in globalization and changes in poverty (assuming that the period is long enough for the long-run effect to 
dominate). Needless to say, the long-run, poverty-decreasing effects from globalization may be small 
and/or take more than 15 years to materialize, in which case we will find that globalization increases 
poverty, or that globalization does not matter at all. 
We first formulate the following empirical model, where countries are represented by i and time by t:  
  it t i it it it it X Glob Glob Poverty                 3 2
2
1 1 1   (1) 
In  equation  (1),  Glob  is  a  vector  for  different  types  of  globalization,  and  because  the  impact  of 
globalization  on  poverty  is  unlikely  to  be  instant,  these  variables  are  lagged.  For  example,  average 
globalization in 1983–1987 is used to explain average poverty in 1988–1992.10  
X is a vector that includes the additional covariates presented above, which are either classified 
as potential mediators through which globalization influences poverty or as exogenous factors affecting poverty 
                                                           
10 Lagging globalization also reduces the bias following from potentially reverse causality between globalization and poverty. One 
reason  for  expecting  a  reverse  causality is  that  donor  programs targeting  poor  countries  have  recently  often  recommended 
economic openness as a main policy. 
A                      
B                      
t-1                                 t                              t+1                      
Poverty                      
Time                      
A                      
B                      13 
 
but not themselves influenced by globalization.  i  corresponds to a country-fixed effect that captures 
stable differences in poverty between countries, while  t  is a period-fixed effect capturing the influence of 
shocks that affect poverty in multiple countries at the same time.  it   is an error term assumed to be 
normally distributed.11   
To economize on data, we begin by estimating a relatively parsimonious baseline, controlling 
only for country  log  real  GDP  per  capita  (PPP  adjusted)  from  the  World  Bank  (2010).  To  maximize 
comparability  across  specifications,  including  the  same  indicator  of  globalization,  we  let  the  sample 
contain  the  same  countries.  The  number  of  observations  might,  however,  vary  across  index-specific 
estimations.12  Table 2 presents baseline results using panel regressions.  
 
TABLE 2. Baseline panel regression results. Dependent variable: Headcount index      
 
Looking first at the aggregated index (columns 1 to 2), globalization negatively associates with absolute 
poverty but with decreasing marginal effect, which is consistent with the inverted J-curve hypothesis. Note 
                                                           
11 The null hypothesis of no country effects is rejected in all estimations. Consequently, a pooled regression model for analyzing 
the association between globalization and poverty is not appropriate. Moreover, using a Hausman test, the random-effect model is 
rejected against the fixed-effect model. Time dummies are jointly significant in a majority of baseline specifications, suggesting 
they should be included in the model. 
12 Notably, results do not change when restricting the sample to the very same observations across all specifications.  In this case, 
the sample consists of 283 observations. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KOF (t-1) -1.48*** -1.23***
[0.40] [0.40]
KOF (t-1)^2 0.01*** 0.01***
[0.00] [0.00]
KOF1 (t-1) -0.85*** -0.83***
[0.25] [0.25]
KOF1 (t-1)^2 0.01*** 0.01***
[0.00] [0.00]
KOF2 (t-1) -0.98*** -0.81***
[0.27] [0.27]
KOF2 (t-1)^2 0.01*** 0.01***
[0.00] [0.00]
GDP per capita (t) -8.16* -10.06** -11.43***
[4.51] [4.10] [4.25]
Constant 59.42*** 116.12*** 43.53*** 122.03*** 43.68*** 129.34***
[12.45] [34.27] [6.98] [31.79] [6.37] [33.86]
R-squared (within) 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.27
Observations 301 301 294 294 301 301
Number of countries 106 106 101 101 105 105
Robust standard errors in brackets.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.14 
 
that the aggregate index includes political globalization that we do not analyze separately.13  Results for the 
different types of globalization (columns 3 to 6) suggest that the poverty-decreasing effect holds for both 
economic and social globalization. As expected, the size of the association decreases when controlling for 
income, but only marginally. This suggests that globalization tends to decrease poverty, but not mainly via 
the income channel—at least in the short run captured by our panel. 
Examining what indicators of economic and social globalization drive the negative association 
with poverty in table 3 gives some clear and interesting results. Including trade flows and trade restrictions 
separately and together (column 1 to 6) suggests that the significant coefficient on economic globalization 
comes from restrictions rather than from flows.14  A similar exercise for social globalization (columns 7 to 
14) points to the importance of information flows for decreasing poverty, while cultural proximity actually 
seems to have a small poverty-increasing effect when all components of social globalization are included 
simultaneously. 
 
                                                           
13 Examining the effect of political globalization separately reveals a poverty-increasing effect, which is not robust and appears to 
be driven by less democratic countries. 
14 Note that restrictions and flows are not very highly correlated (r = 0.51) because exports and imports tend to be higher as a 
share of GDP in smaller countries. 15 
 
TABLE 3. Baseline panel regression results cont. Dependent variable: Headcount index     
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Trade flows (t-1) -0.33* -0.26 -0.25 -0.17
[0.17] [0.17] [0.19] [0.17]
Trade flows (t-1)^2 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Restrictions (t-1) -0.54** -0.65*** -0.55** -0.61**
[0.23] [0.24] [0.26] [0.27]
Restrictions (t-1)^2 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.01**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Personal contact (t-1) -1.16* -0.75 -0.47 -0.07
[0.66] [0.63] [0.49] [0.49]
Personal contact (t-1)^2 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.00
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Information flows (t-1) -0.85*** -0.81*** -0.92*** -1.00***
[0.18] [0.19] [0.17] [0.19]
Information flows (t-1)^2 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Cultural proximity (t-1) -0.13 -0.07 0.11 0.18**
[0.13] [0.11] [0.10] [0.09]
Cultural proximity (t-1)^2 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
GDP per capita (t) -9.47** -11.26*** -10.06** -12.64*** -14.42*** -9.29** -11.83***
[4.40] [4.19] [4.39] [4.51] [4.38] [4.43] [4.09]
Constant 31.19*** 103.91*** 30.65*** 126.28*** 41.22*** 120.62*** 40.72*** 134.58*** 44.03*** 156.04*** 16.99*** 93.18** 50.21*** 136.28***
[4.58] [33.62] [7.80] [36.22] [7.50] [34.88] [13.48] [38.14] [4.21] [35.68] [2.60] [36.87] [11.64] [35.83]
R-squared (within) 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.15 0.18 0.26 0.31
Observations 284 284 277 277 255 255 312 312 318 318 253 253 249 249
Number of countries 99 99 95 95 86 86 109 109 114 114 84 84 81 81
Robust standard errors in brackets.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.16 
 
 
IV.  TESTING FOR MECHANISMS AND ROBUSTNESS 
To gain knowledge about potential mediators (factors through which globalization affects poverty) we add 
a number of control variables to the baseline regression as shown in table 4. 
 
TABLE 4. Description of control variables 
Variable  Expected effect 
Average level of education in the 
population over 15 years old 
Negative, i.e. education should 
decrease poverty 
Share of the population residing 
in urban areas 
Ambiguous 
Government final consumption 





Positive, i.e. higher inflation 
should increase poverty 
 
While an expected negative effect of education on poverty is uncontroversial, there are different views on 
the poverty consequences of urbanization. As noted by Leon (2008), the positive and progressive aspects of 
cities  often  recognized  by  historians  and  economists  contrast  with  the  more  pessimistic  tone  of  the 
epidemiological and public health literature, which according to Leon can be traced back to Snow (1855), 
who described the effects of cholera spreading in London during the 1840s. The newer, more optimistic 
view is summarized by Whiting and Unwin (2009), who note that, “Greater urbanization in low income countries 
is an essential component of economic development and from this perspective is both inevitable and desirable” (p. 1737), and 
also clearly evident in the World Development Report 2009 (World Bank, 2009). 
With regard to government consumption, there are several reasons to expect that states with larger 
welfare systems have lower poverty rates, but higher government expenditure does not necessarily imply a 
larger welfare state. For example, many developing countries allocate relatively large shares of public 
expenditures to defense activities, and as shown by Mosley and Suleiman (2007) such expenditures seem 
to hurt, not support, the poor. Inflation is generally assumed to be harmful to the poor, whose assets are 
typically less protected against inflation. Unanticipated inflation may also lead to resource misallocation in 
an attempt to mitigate the uncertainty of future price levels, in turn prohibiting possibilities of progressive 
redistribution, as described by Fischer and Modigliani (1978). 
Table  5  summarizes  the  results  from  regressions  including  control  variables.  To  facilitate 
comparison and interpretations, the table starts by repeating the baseline estimates. Next, we control for 
government consumption as a share of GDP. This variable is not significant and does not change other 
coefficients by much at all, suggesting that government size is not an important mechanism for poverty 
reduction. 17 
 
Urbanization, on the other hand, turns out to be negatively related to poverty, supporting the 
newer rather than the older view as described earlier, but the variable inclusion does not change the 
globalization  coefficients.  Perhaps  more  surprisingly,  education  seems  to  be  unrelated  to  poverty. 
Inflation, interestingly, turns out to associate with less poverty. This unexpected result may in part be 
explained by the fact that many poor consume self-grown crops and also sell part of the crops at market 
prices. In this way, they are protected against the adverse effects of inflation. Finally, including all the 
above control variables in the same specification changes little except for small reductions in the size of 
the globalization coefficients. 
Finally, we examine if the relationship between globalization and poverty depends on the level 
of democracy using the Polity IV index by Marshall and Jaggers (2009), which ranges from 10 to 10 with 
higher values indicating more democratic regimes.17  Including only observations with a Polity IV score of 
at least 7 in the regression (there are 115 such observations from  50 countries, with an average Polity IV 
score of 8.26), results in a slightly larger coefficient on the aggregated globalization index, and also marks 
social globalization insignificant. The insignificance of social globalization masks, however, a negativ e 
effect of information flows and a positive effect of cultural proximity, similarly to the full sample. For 
economic globalization, the effect seems driven by restrictions, again similarly to the full sample. 
Running a separate regression on the remaining  186 observations (coming from 82 countries 
with an average Polity IV score of 2.76) reveals that the negative coefficient on economic globalization in 
less democratic countries is driven by trade flows rather than restrictions, contrary to the results using the 
full sample. 
                                                           
17 The index aims to capture three elements of democracy: (i) the presence of institutions and procedures enabling citizens to 
express their preferences for policies and leaders; (ii) the existence of effective constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive; and (iii) guarantee of civil liberties to participate in the political process. 18 
 
TABLE 5. Exploring the mechanisms from globalization to poverty reduction 
   19 
 
TABLE 5. Exploring the mechanisms from globalization to poverty reduction, cont. 
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Sindzingre (2005) suggests variability in the impact of globalization on poverty outcomes may stem from 
discontinuities and particularly emphasize institutions as a critical factor for the impact of globalization on 
the  poor. Following  this  argument,  it  seems relevant to  analyze  if  there  are  circumstances  when  the 
relationship of interest is particularly strong. Table 6 presents results for estimations, including interaction 
terms  between  dimensions  of  globalization  and  various  factors.  While  the  globalization–poverty 
association does not significantly vary with the quality of institutions or level of democracy, globalization 
seems particularly poverty reducing in countries with a large informal sector. Results further suggest that 
globalization  is  beneficial  for  the  rural  poor.  We  also  examine  possible  complementarities  between 
economic and social globalization but do not find any significant interaction effect. 
 
TABLE 6. Interaction effects 
 
To further check the robustness of our baseline findings using panel regressions, table A4 in the Appendix 
presents the results from the following sensitivity tests: changing the specification to a random effects 
model, using globalization in period t rather than t-1, excluding observations with extreme values of 
globalization  and  poverty,  using  alternative  measures  of  poverty,  and  excluding  various  geographical 
regions. Overall baseline results are very robust to various changes, suggesting that globalization is good 
for the poor. In particular, more liberal trade restrictions and larger information flows correlate with less 
absolute poverty. 
   
V.  THE LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBALIZATION AND POVERTY 
As an alternative to the panel specification, we study the development of globalization and poverty by 
considering the difference over a longer time period, running the following regression:  
  i i i i X Glob Poverty           ) ( ) ( 2 1      (2) 21 
 
In equation (2),  i Poverty     refers to the difference in poverty in country i over a certain time period. 
This specification maximizes the possibility of capturing mechanisms that decrease poverty in the long run 
by increasing growth. Following Ravallion (2006), we maximize the length of this time period for each 
country, and the dependent variable might consequently correspond to changes in poverty over different 
periods for different countries. To separate this analysis from the panel examination, we only include 
changes that take place over 10 to 15 years, excluding countries for which we only have information on 
poverty in two adjacent time periods.   i Glob   refers to the change in globalization in country i and 
corresponds  to  the  same  number  of  years  as  the  country -specific  poverty  spell.  For  example,  in  our 
sample there is information on poverty outcomes in Zambia for all four time periods of the panel. We 
therefore calculate the change in poverty by taking the poverty level in 2005 minus the poverty level in 
1990. Likewise, we calculate the Zambian change in globalization using a 15-year time spell. To overcome 
potential reverse causality, we lag the change in globalization by one time period. In the Zambian example, 
this variable is thus derived by using data on globalization for 1985 and 1970.  
A  first  difference  analysis  bundles  all  time-invariant  country  characteristics  into  an  error 
component,  and  estimates  the  relationship  between  globalization  and  poverty  robustly  to  latent 
heterogeneity  due  to  time-invariant  effects.  Specifications,  however,  include  information  on  economic 
growth and initial poverty, referring to the poverty level in the earliest year in each country’s poverty spell. 
Table 7 presents baseline results, while table A5 in the Appendix shows a sensitivity analysis of long-run 
relationship estimations. In general, the long-run, first difference analysis confirms the previous results. 
While growth does decrease poverty, it is clearly not the most important mediator even in this longer time 
perspective, suggesting the largest part of the poverty-reducing effect of globalization is mediated through 
other factors. The result that trade restrictions and information flows matter are once again confirmed, 
while the positive poverty effect of cultural proximity appearing in some of the panel estimations is gone 
when applying a long-run perspective. 22 
 
 
TABLE 7. The long-run relationship between globalization and poverty – Baseline results 
 











ΔPersonal contact -0.227 -0.071
[0.242] [0.244]
ΔInformation flows -0.419*** -0.385***
[0.117] [0.122]
ΔCultural proximity -0.113* -0.068
[0.0573] [0.058]
Initial poverty -0.292*** -0.299*** -0.233*** -0.263*** -0.335*** -0.336*** -0.238*** -0.229*** -0.235*** -0.233*** -0.252*** -0.267*** -0.279***
[0.054] [0.053] [0.055] [0.052] [0.057] [0.054] [0.062] [0.062] [0.063] [0.059] [0.055] [0.067] [0.064]
Economic growth -0.067** -0.087*** -0.054** -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.069*** -0.077*** -0.056** -0.079*** -0.055**
[0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.021] [0.018] [0.019] [0.021] [0.024] [0.025] [0.027]
Constant 13.51*** 13.55*** 5.331** 8.782*** 14.19*** 14.65*** 4.974** 7.362*** 8.404*** 4.235** 13.17*** 7.236*** 14.59***
[3.605] [3.605] [2.270] [2.369] [3.320] [3.065] [1.925] [2.537] [2.521] [1.730] [3.395] [2.693] [3.856]
Observations 70 70 70 70 71 71 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
R-squared 0.356 0.405 0.280 0.374 0.465 0.496 0.309 0.343 0.349 0.296 0.434 0.323 0.446
Robust standard errors in brackets.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.23 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
We set out to test the links and mechanisms from globalization to poverty reduction. Our results are 
coherent enough to identify some interesting patterns. First, there is no evidence that globalization is 
associated with higher poverty levels in developing countries. While we cannot identify causal effects, the 
relationship between the lagged aggregate KOF Index of globalization and poverty is always negative and 
significant in almost all regressions. To describe the size of the effect, consider the case of Bangladesh. 
Between 1980 and 2000, the country increased its KOF value from 8 to 30. According to our estimates, 
this translates to a reduction of absolute poverty by 12 percentage points. The size of the effect is not at 
all remarkable, as it roughly means that it takes a two standard deviation increase in globalization to 
decrease poverty by half a standard deviation. Note, however, that the effect is in addition to the decrease 
explained by GDP growth. 
Looking closer at the factors included in the index, less trade restrictions and larger information 
flows  are  robustly  associated  with  lower  poverty  levels.  Our  results  also  indicate  that  globalization 
decreases poverty more when the informal and the rural sectors are relatively bigger. Finally, we find clear 
evidence that the main part of the poverty-decreasing effect is not mediated via the growth channel. 
Analyzing trade flows only, the standard approach (assuming that trade increases growth and 
growth decreases poverty) holds up well. In both the short-run and long-run analysis, we find that higher 
trade flows are on average followed by lower poverty, but the effect is no longer significant once we 
control for income or growth. However, the fact that trade restrictions turn out to be more robust than 
trade flows should probably be carefully interpreted: Deaton (1995) notes that trade data may be biased 
upwards due to over-invoicing of imports, a method often used to transfer funds abroad from low-
income countries, causing a systematic bias in trade data and in national accounts. 
For both trade restrictions and information flows, a relatively large poverty-decreasing effect 
remains  after  controlling  for  GDP  per  capita,  suggesting  that  the  standard  approach  actually 
underestimates  the  poverty-reducing  impact  of  globalization.  How  can  the  result  that  globalization 
decreases poverty but not via growth be explained? 
A possible explanation is that there are income distribution effects such that the incomes of the 
poor  increase  more  than  the  average  income.  Another  possibility  is  that  the  result  is  caused  by 
measurement  errors  in  the  GDP  data.  As  discussed  by  Heston  (1994),  productivity  increases  in  the 
subsistence sector and the informal sector, which are often insufficiently captured in GDP data. Because 
these sectors are typically bigger when the rural sector is larger, this explanation is supported by the 
interaction effects, which suggest that globalization reduces poverty more when the informal and rural 24 
 
sectors are larger. These results should therefore be carefully interpreted and may simply indicate that less 
actual growth is captured by GDP data in countries with bigger rural and informal sectors.18  
Despite these concerns about data quality and measurement problems, we still believe our 
results leave room for cautious optimism. The rapid increase in usage of mobile phones and the Internet is 
most likely not a statistical artifact caused by measurement problems. As noted by Aker and Mbiti (2010), 
there has been a massive increase in mobile phone use subscribers in sub -Saharan Africa during the past 
decade, and according to our estimates this should make it easier for these countries to meet the first UN 
Millennium Development Goals of cutting the proportion of people living on less than one dollar a day by 
2015 in half.  Moreover, although the fact that many low -income countries embarked on programs of 
external economic liberalization in recent decades has been intensely debated, our analysis suggests that 
the  underlying premises  of  current  and  previous  poverty  reduction strategies  are  correct:  poverty 
reduction can be achieved by means of closer economic integration and higher levels of globalization. 
 
   
   
                                                           
18  Deaton  (1995)  also  discusses  complications  with  the  GDP  data  in  developing  countries,  and  suggests  that  consumption 
measures based on household surveys may be preferable to measures based on national accounts. 25 
 
APPENDIX 
TABLE A1.   The KOF Index of Globalization 
A. Economic Globalization  
i) Actual Flows  
  Trade (percent of GDP) 
  Foreign direct investment, flows (percent of GDP) 
  Foreign direct investment, stocks (percent of GDP) 
  Portfolio investment (percent of GDP) 
  Income payments to foreign nationals (percent of GDP) 
ii) Restrictions 
  Hidden import barriers 
  Mean tariff rate 
  Taxes on international trade (percent of current revenue) 
  Capital account restrictions 
  
B. Social Globalization 
 
i) Data on Personal Contacts 
  Outgoing telephone traffic 
  Transfers (percent of GDP) 
  International tourism 
  Foreign population (percent of total population) 
  International letters (per capita) 
ii) Data on Information Flows 
  Internet hosts (per 1000 people) 
  Internet users (per 1000 people) 
  Cable television (per 1000 people) 
  Trade in newspapers (percent of GDP) 
  Radios (per 1000 people) 
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity 
  Number of McDonald’s restaurants (per capita) 
  Number of IKEAs (per capita) 
  Trade in books (percent of GDP) 
 
C. Political Globalization 
 
Embassies in country 
Membership in international organizations 
Participation in UN Security Council missions 
 
 





 TABLE A2.   Descriptive statistics 
   
 
TABLE A3.   Sample coverage 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Headcount 24,80 25,29 0,00 92,55 World Bank 2010a
Poverty gap 9,82 12,44 0,00 63,34 World Bank 2010a
Squared poverty gap 5,35 7,99 0,00 48,51 World Bank 2010a
KOF 45,41 12,19 17,11 80,46 Dreher et al. 2008
KOF1 45,96 14,62 10,66 88,17 Dreher et al. 2008
KOF2 38,83 15,94 9,09 82,75 Dreher et al. 2008
Flows 51,95 17,61 8,76 92,21 Dreher et al. 2008
Restrictions 45,27 17,05 10,16 93,59 Dreher et al. 2008
Personal contact 37,13 16,40 8,74 79,23 Dreher et al. 2008
Information flows 42,33 18,98 6,29 88,34 Dreher et al. 2008
Cultural proximity 35,46 22,26 1,00 85,98 Dreher et al. 2008
Ln Real GDP per capita (PPP) 8,01 0,95 5,58 10,07 World Bank 2010b
Economic growth 10,81 20,07 -64,87 96,97 World Bank 2010b
Government expenditure (percent of GDP) 13,74 5,07 3,65 32,79 World Bank 2010b
Urban population (share of total) 47,98 20,21 6,28 92,19 World Bank 2010b
Inflation 2,37 1,33 -0,12 7,79 World Bank 2010b
Primary education 5,46 1,01 3,00 8,00 World Bank 2010b
Polity2 2,80 6,22 -9,00 10,00 Marshall and Jaggers 2009
East Asia & Pacific 0,12 0,32 0,00 1,00 World Bank 2010b
Europe and Central Asia 0,24 0,43 0,00 1,00 World Bank 2010b
Latin America and the Carribean 0,25 0,43 0,00 1,00 World Bank 2010b
Middle East and North Africa 0,07 0,26 0,00 1,00 World Bank 2010b
South Asia 0,06 0,23 0,00 1,00 World Bank 2010b
sub-Saharan Africa 0,26 0,44 0,00 1,00 World Bank 2010b
Albania Colombia Indonesia Nicaragua Togo
Algeria Congo, Dem. Rep. Iran, Islamic Rep. Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Angola Congo, Rep. Jamaica Nigeria Tunisia
Argentina Costa Rica Jordan Pakistan Turkey
Armenia Cote d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Panama Uganda
Azerbaijan Croatia Kenya Papua New Guinea Ukraine
Bangladesh Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic Paraguay Uruguay
Belarus Ecuador Latvia Peru Venezuela, RB
Benin Egypt, Arab Rep. Lesotho Philippines Vietnam
Bolivia El Salvador Lithuania Poland Yemen, Rep.
Bosnia and Herzegovina Estonia Macedonia, FYR Romania Zambia
Botswana Ethiopia Madagascar Russian Federation
Brazil Gabon Malawi Rwanda
Bulgaria Gambia, The Malaysia Senegal
Burkina Faso Georgia Mali Sierra Leone
Burundi Ghana Mauritania Slovenia
Cambodia Guatemala Mexico South Africa
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Moldova Sri Lanka
Cape Verde Guyana Mongolia Suriname
Central African Republic Haiti Morocco Swaziland
Chad Honduras Mozambique Tajikistan
Chile Hungary Namibia Tanzania
China India Nepal Thailand27 
 
TABLE A4. Sensitivity tests   
   28 
 
Table A4. Sensitivity tests, cont.    
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TABLE A5. The long-run relationship between globalization and poverty – Sensitivity analysis19   
 
                                                           
19 Explanatory note: For each dimension of globalization and related sub-components, we run four regressions to test the robustness of our baseline findings on the 
long-run relationship between globalization and poverty. First, we exclude observations with extreme values of changes in poverty defined as countries with at least a change in 
poverty over the period further than two standard deviations away from the sample mean. Second, we exclude extreme values of changes in globalization according to the 
same rule. Finally, we sequentially control for geographical regions. With regard to social globalization, there are no observations classified as extreme values resulting in three 
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